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DEVELOPMENTAL ETHICS.
BY ANTONIO LLANO.
HUMAN PERFECTION, or the perfecting of mankind, has
often been proposed as the object as well as the criterion of
ethics. Although absolute perfection, in the sense of a state than
which there is not a better, may not be readily apprehended, nor,
much less, realised, yet we can form a clear conception of relative
perfection, in the sense of a condition better than the present con-
dition, or than any other condition taken as a term of comparison.
And, since all ethics, whatever its particular views, deals with the
means of bettering the condition of man, whether individually or
collectively, or at least with the means of keeping that condition
from retrograding, we may perhaps with propriety say that every
system of ethics aims at the perfection of mankind ; or, in the lan-
guage of moral philosophy, that perfection is the end of ethics.
Nor is this all : the very word end implies that the relative perfec-
tion we have in view is not to be considered as a means or instru-
ment in the prosecution of some farther object ; for in this case
that farther object, not perfection, would be the end of ethics.
This we express by saying that perfection, of one kind or another,
is to be considered as an end in itself, to be striven after for its own
sake, and not for the sake of something else ; although it is obvious
that, there being no end without a means, ethics must necessarily
relate to the means requisite for the attainment of the end, no less
than to the end itself.
But the nature of this end is more or less definite, more or less
vague, according to the view we take of perfection, i. e. , accord-
ing to the norm constituting our ethical guide and standard. We
may, with the hedonist, make of pleasurable feeling our standard
of perfection j and the practice of morality, in this case, being di-
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rected towards the enjoyment of pleasure, either by ourselves or
others, we have secured our end, in every special instance, when
either we or others have experienced the feelings in question ; and
these feelings being all we seek, we may describe them as consti-
tuting an end by itself ; an end, moreover, which is perfectly defi-
nite, and v/hose character as an end—its finalness—is distinctly per-
ceived. Or we may, with the ordinary intuitionist, establish a
difference between the "higher" and the ''lower" natures of man,
including in the former all his virtuous tendencies, or the dictates
of his "moral sense" ; and in this case (although the distinction is
by no means clear), we may still say that a given virtue, such as
chastity (a favorite "virtue" with many writers, among them Mr.
Lecky), is to be practised for no other reason than because it is an
element of our " better nature " ; because we know (or, rather, feel')
that it is better to be pure than to be impure, irrespective of all
consequences, either to ourselves or others. Here, also, as in the
preceding instance, we have an end by itself, inasmuch as virtuous
actions are performed, not in order to attain any remote ends, but
because we conceive that by performing them we are what we
"ought to be." In both of the above cases the object in view is
the satisfaction of what is, or is alleged to be, a specific feeling
;
and once the feeling has been satisfied, our goal, for the time, has
been reached. The common characteristic of the two systems is
that they both present a relatively final condition, whether pleas-
ure or virtuousness, as the object of conduct; that they both find
the ethical standard in an ideal capable of being completely re-
alised.
The case, however, is somewhat different when we consider
perfection in a dynamical instead of a statical sense ; v^hen we
regard morality as a factor in the evolution of mankind, subject
itself to the laws of change and adaptation, and playing no other
part than that of an accelerating force impelling the human race
in its uninterrupted onward and upward motion. The difference
between this position and those mentioned above is, that, although
the intuitionist and the evolutio-hedonist may hold, and do hold,
that morality is a very powerful element in the development of the
race, yet it is not a necessary consequence of their views that mor-
ality should be practised because of its developmental value ; in
other words, development is not their ethical criterion or standard.
On the other hand, the doctrine now under consideration regards
morality as having human progress for its main object \ whence it
follows that progress, in one form or another, is the ethical crite-
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rion, the standard b)' which conduct is to be judged and measured.
A system of ethics of this description may, I think, be more par-
ticularly termed an ethics of perfection. Its distinctive character-
istic lies in this—that the end of every moral action, being subserv-
ient to the farther end of human progress, is only a relative end,
not an end by itself ; and, as such, may be more adequately de-
scribed as a means, while the real end of ethics is a never-realised
ideal which recedes from us in proportion as we approach it, or
which constantly and continuously changes in proportion as it is
partially realised. We may, however, take another view of the
matter, and, by picturing to ourselves the evolution of the race as
an unceasing motion, consider this motion as an end by itself,
which, with respect to our actions, is attained when we are satis-
fied that they have been factors contributory to the preservation or
acceleration of that motion.
Of all the various forms in which the ethics of perfection has
appeared, there is one which, affirming to be founded exclusively
on the law of cosmic evolution, as that law is understood by the
foremost thinkers of the age, claims for itself, as legitimate prop-
erty, the title of evolutionary ethics. Unfortunately, however, this
appellation has been already appropriated by such systems as those
presented in the works of Leslie Stephen and Herbert Spencer,
whose doctrines, from a purely ethical point of view, are almost
(not entirely) diametrically opposed to the doctrines with which I
am now dealing. It becomes necessary, therefore, to make a dis-
tinction, and I think we may give the name developmetital ethics to
that system of ethics whose moral standard is development, espe-
cially mental development ; in which the morality of an action is
measured by its fitness to enter as a new factor in the sum total of
forces impelling the human race in its upward motion.
Of this ethics Dr. Paul Carus, editor of The Monist, is a very
strong adherent and enthusiastic advocate. It is the object of the
present essay to examine the most salient points of his doctrines, as
they can be gathered from his numerous writings. I shall, first, en-
deavor to present an outline of his views, not indeed in the literal
form in which he has stated them, but as they can be logically in-
terpreted. In following this method of exposition I am not actu-
ated by the pretentious hope of improving upon Dr. Carus's lucid
and vigorous presentation of his subject : my reasons are of a more
plausible nature. In the first place, an uninterrupted series of quo-
tations is almost always monotonous, especially when they are
from a well-known writer ; and, in the second place, the critic, by
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presenting, as he understands them, the views he wishes to discuss,
shows at once what he conceives the position of his author to be,
and on what interpretation of his author's ideas he will base his
criticism.
II.
Having, through the constant study of nature, acquired a scien-
tific or positivist habit of mind, we have reversed the principles of
the old systems of philosophy ; and, no longer seeking to evolve
natural phenomena from the purely formal operations of our un-
derstanding, we seek in natural phenomena the materials to be
combined and elaborated in those operations. However consistent
our theories, however rigorous our reasonings, they will evidently
remain nothing but pure forms of thought, answering to no ob-
jective realities, unless the premises have been taken from the ob-
jective world itself. But, if it is true that, in the language of Kant,
pure formal thought is ''empty," it is equally true that pure sen-
sations, the data of experience, are " blind "; whence the necessity,
on the one side, of looking in experience for the real content of
knowledge, and, on the other side, of looking in formal thought for
the meaning or interpretation of sensations. Experience furnishes
the premises, but logic must give us the conclusions : without the
classifications of experience in the categories of formal thought, the
coherence and unification in which real knowledge consist would
be impossible; man might be a sentient being, but not a cogitative
being. The laws of logic, however, are not isolated subjectivities,
disconnected from the world of experience : they are conditions of
thought corresponding to certain conditions of objective reality :
they have been arrived at by the elimination of all the special prop-
erties of reality, except the most general property, without which
no reality can be conceived, viz., fortn. The laws of logic being,
then, nothing but the laws of form, they must be applicable to any
system of reality where form is the primary condition of existence.
It follows that to that regularity and uniformity known in logic as
consistency, there must correspond that regularity and uniformity
in nature we describe by the term law—natural law. Hence we
arrive at the conception of the universe as being not a chaos, but
of necessity a cosmos, an orderly concatenation of causes and effects,
where events, which are only changes of form, are invariably de-
termined by the preceding forms of existence. Furthermore, the
correspondence between the operations of formal thought and the
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objective realities of nature arises from their very identity, or their
oneness ; for the laws of logic are the subjective aspect of the lavs^s
of nature working in the cerebral substance ; they do not dictate or
create order, but are the consciousness of the order followed by na-
ture in the process of organisation : they are self-conscious nature,
becoming aware of the conditions she has fulfilled, and must have
fulfilled, in the course of her evolution—nature, so to speak, inter-
preting herself.^
If, having established the universality of law, we ask ourselves
what view we are to take of the phenomenal world in its entirety,
we arrive at very important generalisations. Not only the very con-
ception of the universe as a cosmos leads us to consider it as a unit-
ary system of reality, but the development of all scientific knowl-
edge points in the same direction. Knowledge is a continuous
process of inclusion and harmonisation : of inclusion, in the sense
that every new fact is understood when it has been referred to, or
included in, a general order of facts or experiences formulated by
us as a law ; of harmonisation, in the sense that the inclusion of a
particular fact in a general order of facts consists in harmonising
the new fact with the other known facts, in making objective the
subjective requisite of consistency. In this manner we are led, by
the very nature of cognition, to the theoretical conclusion that a
perfect understanding of the v/hole world of phenomena is only pos-
sible by the reduction of all modes of existence to one single, uni-
versal law, of which particular laws are but special manifestations,
or special aspects, conditioned by the special forms in which the
one universal law exhibits itself. Thus the consistency of facts with
one another is easily accounted for on the theory of their oneness
;
a theory which is not merely the result of abstract speculation, but
a legitimate induction based on the well-established truths of ex-
perimental science. All science, indeed, aims at the realisation of
monism, of a continuity in nature which is the characteristic mark
of its unity ; and, as said before, the solution of scientific problems
consists in bringing new phenomena within the applicability of one
law, or in extending the range of the law so as to make it embrace,
in a synthetic whole, a greater number of phenomena. An un-
solved problem is an apparent break of continuity, which disap-
pears on the solution of the problem : so long as the break of con-
tinuity exists, the problem remains unsolved.^
1 See chapter on "Form and Formal Thought" in Dr. C^xms's Fundamental Problems, 2nd
edit., Chicago, 1894.
2 See Fundamental Problems, pp. 7, 20, 21, 22; also. The Monist, I., 2, p. 240. "The unitary
conception of the world has become a postulate of science. Indeed, the single sciences, each one
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One exception seemed for many centuries to defy all efforts di-
rected towards including it in the one universal whole ; and the
philosophers of the past were, and many of our own generation are,
wont to dwell, sometimes with devout satisfaction, sometimes with
the pangs of despair, on the impassable chasm, impossible of being
bridged, separating the realm of life and consciousness from the
lower realm of dead and inert matter. To-day, however, with the
progress of natural science, the chasm is becoming narrower and
narrower ; and if we cannot say that we have actually bridged it,
we can, in some measure, see one shore from the other shore, and
are not unwarranted in suggesting the means by which the inter-
vening distance may be satisfactorily spanned. The doctrine of
evolution, by tracing the most complex forms of life to the relatively
simple compound known as protoplasm, has familiarised us with
the truth that matter is possessed of potentialities never before
dreamed of, and also with the all-important truth that two phases
of the same process may appear, when taken at sufficient distance
from each other, as independent, and even disparate, facts ; but
that, by gradual, infinitesimal changes of the one fact, we may
finally arrive at the other as its necessary consequence. A gap in
nature may, therefore, simply indicate, not that the gap is so in
reality, but that we are unacquainted with the ''connecting links."
Were we ignorant of the laws of thermotics, we should, no doubt,
dogmatically affirm, as an axiomatic truth, that so disparate two
facts as heat and cold could never change into each other, nor one
originate from the other. The thermometer, however, soon con-
vinces us of our error ; while, if we stop to reflect on the gradual
change of a low into a high temperature, all the apparent contra-
diction disappears at once. A chasm between any two facts of na-
ture is a subjective discontinuity, not an objective discontinuity; it
is a discontinuous perception of a continuous reality.
Since, according to the theory of evolution, the most complex
forms of consciousness have evolved from the apparently uncon-
scious protoplasm, we must believe that the material elements con-
stituting this protoplasm already contain, in a latent form, all the
elements of mind ; contain feeling in potentia, not otherwise than as
molar motion contains the potentialities of heat ; or, to use a very
striking illustration, as darkness contains the potentialities of light.
^
in its province, have always worked out and endeavored to verify the principles of monism.
Every fact which seems to contradict the principle of unity must be, and indeed it is, considered
as a problem until it conforms to it. As soon as it is found to be in unison with all the other
facts the problem is solved." [Fundamental Problems, p. 22.)
1 The Monist, I., i, pp. 85-86.
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And it does not require a long stretch of imagination, nor is it
illogical or unscientific to conclude, that those very potentialities
exist as constituent elements of the material particles composing
the protoplasm ; while the transition from unorganised matter to
protoplasmic matter is no more impossible (although we are as
yet ignorant of the process) than the transition of mere protoplas-
mic matter to man. In this hypothesis the vexed question as to the
origin of life disappears as unmeaning : life, in its rudiments, is a
property of all matter, and, as matter, is eternal, and calls for no
explanation. The problem, then, for science to solve, is not,
''What is the origin of life?" but—"What is the origin of that
form of matter known as protoplasm?" And the latter problem is
not only scientifically intelligible, but its solution is readily con-
ceived as both possible and probable.^
1 Dr. Carus's views as to the universality of life may be found in Fundamental Problems, pp.
110-133, 185-187, 300. His views on "The Origin of Mind " may be read in The Monist, I., i, and
Fundamental Problems, pp. 345-347. The theory of the origin of mind from what Professor Clif-
ford called "mind-stuff," or "elements of feeling," is very clearly and forcibly stated by Dr.
Carus in the following terms: " Subjectivity cannot originate out of nothing; it must be con-
ceived as the product of a co-operation of certain elements which are present in the objective
world. In other words, the elements of the subjective world are features that we must suppose
to be inseparably united with the elements of the objective world which are represented in our
mind as motions. This leads to the conclusion that feeling has to be considered not as a simple
but as a complex phenomenon. Feelings originate through a combination of elements of feeling;
and the presence of elements of feeling must be supposed to be an intrinsic property of the ob-
jective world." {The Monist, I., i, p. 72.) "As light originates out of darkness, being a special
mode of motion, so feeling originates out of the not-feeling. The not-feeling accordingly contains
the conditions of feeling in a similar way as potential energy contains the potentiality of kinetic
energy, or as molar motion contains potentially the molecular motion of heat, light, and electri-
city." {/iJ/o'., pp. 85-86.) I have quoted this theory at some length, for two reasons: in the first
place, because it exhibits in a very plain light the scientific and naturalistic, and, therefore, de-
terministic view Dr. Carus takes of man as a natural phenomenon submitted ultimately to the
laws of chemistry and mechanics (he repudiates this description of his views, but I think its ac-
curacy can be substantiated, making due allowance for the meaning of words), and this is of
great importance for my main purpose ; and, in the second place (and although this has no direct
bearing on my subject, 1 may be allowed to make a short digression), because, although the theory
is open to serious criticisms (at least as to its form), it is, one of the most striking illustrations of
the revolution worked in philosophy by the evolutionary doctrines and methods of analysis ; for
we no longer regard natural phenomena as mechanical jnixtures, whose properties are identical
with those of the elements mixed, but as combinations, whose properties, although resultants of
the properties of the combining elements, are not identical with these.—The theistic argument of
Locke based on the non-cogitativeness of matter is well known. He argues that, if cogitativeness
were a property of matter, then, since matter is discontinuous (in the sense that it is not all " one
being"), every particle must be cogitative, and every particle being eternal, every particle must
be eternally cogitative, and, therefore (he thinks to have proved that the eternal being must be
"all-knowing"), every particle must be a God. (Locke, Of Human Understanding, book IV.'
chap. X. Comp. Leibnitz, Nouveatix Essais, liv. IV., ch. x. ) Besides a defective logic, we at once
discover the error of assuming that mind is a simple, irreducible fact, not derivable from another
simple and disparate fact—matter ; and that mind, owing to its very simpleness, is not conceiv-
able except in all its completeness, as we know it in man or imagine it in God. Locke never
thought there could be such a thing as " elements of feeling," or elements of mind, for he took
mind to be undecomposable ; and it was, therefore, natural for him to suppose that if matter
were cogitative at all, every particle must have a developed will, a perfect memory, and a clear
understanding (although this view, when closely examined, does not tally with the theory of the
acquisition of ideas, which is really a forntatioii of mind).
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III.
The foregoing doctrines as to the nature of the universe and
man do away, in the first place, with that anthropomorphic view
of the world which postulates an independent and arbitrary will
"directing" all phenomena, either from "within" (and this is
called an immanent God), or from "without," as in all popular
forms of theism ; and, in the second place, with that anthropocen-
tric view which considers the will and the feelings of man as having
a legitimate claim on, and absolute authority over, the processes
going on outside of his conscious being. This radical change of
view as to "man's place in nature" necessarily implies an equally
radical change of view with regard to man's conduct—with regard
to ethics. The test of all truth is no longer subjective, but objec-
tive,—not introspective, but experimental; and ethics, if it aspires
to be a science at all, must take its stand on the facts of nature,
considered as objective realities, and formulated into universal laws
by the scientific principles and methods of research. Since our
feelings and our thoughts are not self-existing or independent en-
tities, but are dependent on, and related to, the whole order of
nature, it is necessary to know what that order is, what its laws
are, and how we are connected with them ; and this done, we shall
be enabled to enunciate in truly scientific formulas the special
laws of conduct we ordinarily distinguish as ethical rules.
It may be stated at the outset, that the "authority" for ethics,
the ultimate sanction and standard of conduct, can be no other than
the cosmical order itself. Although the cosmos itself is neither
moral nor immoral, it is the possibility for such a thing as a moral
life; a possibility which, by the development of consciousness, has
become an actuality. When we are convinced that all present ex-
istence is but a feature of the one eternal reality, that our con-
sciousness has been formed and moulded by the invariable laws of
the objective world, and that our actions, being special manifesta-
tions of those laws through the intermediary of feeling, are really
continuations of an uninterrupted motion which comes from eter-
nity and goes to eternity, following one, and only one, direction
;
then we see how idle it is to speculate on what, according to the
fancies of our imagination, ought to be, without taking the trouble
to inquire into the deeper question of what, according to the na-
ture of things as we know them by experience, 7nust be ; and how
liable we are to err when, leaving aside the criterion of objective
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reality, we erect our feelings into a criterion of morality, by con-
fusing those things which are logically possible with those that
alone are actually possible, their possibility being no other than
their very existence. The can is a prerequisite of the moral ought;
but this can^ in order to be so actually and objectively, has to be an
agreement with the universal laws of nature; in which case the can
is identical with the must. The universal laws of nature, then, being
the necessary conditions of actual possibility, are the only justifica-
tion of the moral precepts and the moral ought; and it is a sufficient
guarantee of the morality of an action to show that it harmonises
with those cosmical operations which have been revealed to us by
scientific research. Nor could it be otherwise ; for only that endures
which, as a part, can fit the universal whole of phenomena ; what
does not fit must meet with inevitable ruin; and it is needless to
say that what is doomed to certain failure cannot be a subject of
approbation. In this sense we may say that morality "means obe-
dience to the law," and that "human beings can be moral or im-
moral, according as their conduct agrees with, or does not agree
with, God" (the universe). ^ Our very existence is involved in our
obedience or disobedience to the supreme authority of nature; if
we wish to exist, we must submit to the "cosmical conditions of
existence," and such actions as conform to those conditions must
be considered "good"; other actions, "bad."^
Were we unacquainted with the direction in which the world
moves, with the line of progress in general, and of human progress
in particular, ethics would have no meaning : in the ignorance of
the causal relations between human actions and their consequences,
one form of conduct could have no more justification than another;
at least, no more a priori justification. But if there is a law of
progress, a direction in which alone progress can take place, and
if we know that law, then that law is our only possible norm of
morality.^ This norm has been revealed to us by the doctrine
of evolution, the first of whose teachings is, "that life as it is now
can transcend itself; it can transform itself, and must, according to
nature's laws, transform itself into a higher form of life."* When
"^Fundamental Problems, pp. 315, 321. Dr. Carus constantly reverts to this position—that the
objective phenomena of nature are the supreme authority and criterion of ethics. (See, e. g.,
Fundamental Problems, pp. igS, 257, 322, 328. 329; Religion of Science, second edition, Chicago,
1896, pp. 21, 27; Ethical Problem, Chicago, 1890, p. 31 ; The Monist, I., 4: "The Criterion of Ethics
an Objective Reality.")
"i-Ethical Problem, p. 31.
^'Homilies of Science , Chicago, 1892, p. 37.
iFundamenial Problems, p. 316. " Morality is that which is in concord with the law of evolu-
tion." (The Monist, VI., 4, p. 389.)
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life is thus considered as a necessary, continuous upward movement,
and conduct as one of the factors of this movement, the moral
problem appears no longer as a mere question of ought, but mainly
as a question of must: its solution consists in rationalising the ought
by bringing it within the pale of the must. Shortly stated, the ethics
of development may be thus formulated : Since the world moves
in a certain direction, it must move in that direction ; since it must
move in that direction, we, who are but elements of the world, must
act so as to further that movement. Hence development is at once
the cause, the standard, and the authority of ethics.
Here the very natural question presents itself : What is meant
by development, by progress ? To this Dr. Carus answers that
"the test of progress must be sought in the growth of soul." By
soul, of course, he does not mean an independent and "spiritual"
ego, but simply the mental activity of the nervous structure. For
us, as conscious beings, the world is a system of interconnected
phenomena more or less accurately represented, or "imaged,"
in the cerebral substance ; and, in proportion as our experiences
grow in number and complexity, the representation gains in ac-
curacy and distinctness ; which means that we interpret our feelings
in a more faithful manner, or that there is a closer correspondence
between the subjective states and their objective correlates. Other-
wise stated, soul-progress consists in a constant approach to truth
;
for truth is nothing but the correct interpretation of our feelings,
or a congruity of our mental states with reality.^ Considering, then,
the development of soul as, for us, the most important feature of
cosmical law, we may accept it as a direct criterion of ethics, a
standard of right and wrong ; this standard not being different from
the law of evolution in general, nor from the supreme standard of
universal law, but simply a special aspect of both, or a special point
of view from which we may regard them ; there being, strictly speak-
ing, only one law by which all phenomena are governed, and to
which all particular laws can and must be referred.^
IV.
Such are, if I have understood them aright, the fundamental
principles of developmental ethics. I have dispensed with minor
1 Homilies of Science, pp. 41-42.
2 In this sense, I think, are to be taken Dr. Carus's numerous references to the development
of " soul-life" as the ethical criterion. It is man's duty, he says, to do " that which he needs
must do, according to the laws of nature, to let his soul grow and expand, and to develop to ever
higher and nobler aims." {The Monist, I., 4, p. 560.) "That which makes our souls grow and
evolve is moral, that which dwarfs our souls and prevents their evolution is immoral." {Homilies
of Science, p. 47.) Compare Ethical Problem, p. 42.
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details, it being my main purpose to discuss the bases of the sys-
tem ; but to such particulars as are of capital importance I shall
advert in the course of my discussion. Although I believe that the
postulates set forth by Dr. Carus as the foundations of his ethical
theory are substantially correct, being identical with the generally
accepted scientific doctrines of to-day, it does not appear to me
that he has made a logical application of them ; that is to say, his
ethical corollaries do not seem to be consistent with the general
principles from which he has endeavored to derive them.
The first objection to the ethics of development is one which,
demolishing, as I conceive, the very foundations, brings the whole
structure to the ground ; the objection, namely, that the foregoing
principles themselves are a protest against, and a nullification of,
all ethical judgments ; and that, therefore, it is an incongruity to
speak of morality as deriving its authority from those principles.
If we are nothing but a part of nature ; if our development obeys
necessary, universal laws ; in short, if we ourselves are natural phe-
nomena, is it not a contradiction to say that we can oppose the laws
of nature, and be thereby immoral ? All human passions being of
natural growth, are all alike transformations of the one universal
energy, as it operates in the various forms of material existence;
and passions being the springs of our voluntary actions, the action
of the martyr is as natural as the action of his executioner; they
both follow the laws of their natures, that is, the laws of nature ;
there is nothing in the one that makes his action more " agreeable "
to the cosmical order than the action of the other ; and, judged by
the supreme standard of universal law, they are equally moral, that
is to say, they both act in response to the demands of nature, the
only difference being that nature makes different demands upon dif-
ferent organisms. If, then, the laws of nature in general are to be
accepted as the standard, there is really no standard, for the simple
reason that there is no right or wrong ; and the everlasting objec-
tion against Spinozism remains unanswered, unless we have the
courage to abide by the logical consequences of our postulates, and
declare, with the philosopher, that a scoundrel is no more blamable
for being a scoundrel than a horse for being a horse. ^ For Spinoza,
however, the scoundrel is simply "excusable"; but, according to
that view which identifies morality with naturalness, the scoundrel
must be declared to be actually moral. In fact, since everything
happens, and every man acts, in absolute conformity with the laws
of nature, the criterion of right is nothing but bare reality; right-
^Lettre Ue Spinoza fi H. Oldenberg (CEuvres, t. III., pp. Z7(>--i77, Saisset's trans., Paris, 1872).
DEVELOPMENTAL ETHICS. I 73
ness and existence are ultimately one and the same thing ; and it
were better to do away with all ethical terminology, for such terms
as moral and immoral, good and bad, right and wrong lose all their
significance,when one of the terms of the antithesis has disappeared.
The objection, however, may be partially met by saying, that
our standard is not to be found in the laws of nature in general, but
in the law of evolution in particular ; that ethics takes into consid-
eration the difference between actions which tend to promote, and
actions which tend to retard, the evolutionary movement ; and that
the latter, although really as natural as the former, are by us con-
ceived, at least relatively, as opposed to these, and may, in ordi-
nary language, be said to be antagonistic to the general movement
of the race. There seems, then, no contradiction in classifying con-
duct, as we classify other natural facts, into two different orders :
good actions, which are conducive to development ; and bad ac-
tions, which are opposed to development. And it may be added
that this distinction, when the words are sufficiently understood,
and the hair-splitting of casuistry is not allowed to confuse what is
plain, is entirely intelligible, and may be legitimately used as the
foundation of a science of morality—of an ethics. Furthermore, it
may be argued that the moral feelings from which ethical judgments
arise, are simply the emotional concomitants of human progress
;
that the law of society being a law of evolution, special feelings
evolve, as is to be expected, in harmony with the same law ; and
that thus both the physiological and the psychological aspects of
morality are perfectly understandable : the physiological, in the
sense that a moral person, considered as a social organ, must dis-
charge his functions in a manner subservient to the health and vi-
tality of the whole ; the psychological, in the sense that the actions
and judgments of a moral person are accompanied by those char-
acteristic feelings we distinguish as moral feelings.
While the logical cogency of such a reasoning as this will not
be disputed, the assumptions made are open to the following objec-
tions. As regards the physiological aspect of the question, it can-
not be denied that, if by ethics is meant 7wthing but the science of
the objective relations and consequences of conduct, viewed from
a purely descriptive and non-emotional point of view, the ethics of
development, being a branch of natural science, rests on as solid a
foundation as human physiology; it may, indeed, be termed social
physiology.^ So long as we confine ourselves to tracing the con-
l"If by moral science," says Fouillee, "we mean the science of the necessary conditions
of individual and social progress, we can understand how it was possible for Spinoza to write
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sequences of murder as affecting the stability of the social group
and the sense of security of its members, its effects upon industry,
trade, and other pursuits of our activity, we are within the limits
of descriptive science. But in this there is nothing sufficiently
characteristic to make a separate science, a science of ethics ; for
in the above facts we have nothing but a combination of sociology,
psychology, and political economy ; and, if this is all we have to
deal with, we are only disguising our surrender of ethics with the
obstinate preservation of the name. Although I believe that this
will finally be the only view taken of the matter—that the right-
and-wrong ethics will finally disappear—I do not believe that we
have reached that state, or that ethics is understood in this bare
and indifferent physiological sense. For us ethics implies a special
kind of feelings—moral feelings—and a special kind of judgments
—moral judgments. Ethics, in its present form, deals with the
relations of human conduct considered not only in their external
reality as mere facts or data to be used and elaborated by reason,
according to the pure laws of formal thought : it deals with those
relations in so far as they affect our emotional nature—our concep-
tions and feelings of right and wrong. The part of science in mod-
ern ethics is to bring certain forms of conduct within the pale of the
moral feelings ; to show the connexion between the various forms
of conduct and a recognised emotional standard. When the sur-
geon is asked to justify himself for amputating his patient's limb,
he explains that the operation is necessary in order to save the pa-
tient's life : his science enables him to establish the morality of
his conduct by showing the agreement of his action with a recog-
nised moral judgment—that it is right to save a man's life.
Ethics, then, must take account of an emotional factor, which,
being indispensable to all ethical judgments, has to be considered
as a criterion ; and this criterion, by its very nature, is purely sub-
jective. To say that the amputation of a gangrened limb will save
a man's life is not an ethical proposition ; it is the statement of a
matter of fact, not of a moral judgment. The moral judgment is
passed when we say that we ought to save the man's life, or that
it is our duty to save the man's life. Indeed, Dr. Carus himself, by
his frequent references to the ought, the sense of duty, and other
emotional conditions, as inseparable from morality, has virtually
a science of morality, an ethics." (A. Fouillee, La liberie et le dHerfninisme, sme. 6d., p. 52.)
Here, however, the subjective element, apparently excluded, is virtually included in the term
"progress." Unless progress is maintained to be a moral end, something that ought to be aimed
at, the above description may apply to biology and to sociology, not to ethics.
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surrendered his objective standard.^ Although he has written an
essay intended to prove that ''the criterion of ethics is an object-
ive reality,"^ yet he speaks of ethics as having for its object to
teach us our duty;^ and this is to recognise that the objective cri-
terion, whatever it may be, must be ultimately subordinated to a
subjective criterion ; for, while the apprehension of a fact and its
effects as simple relations of reality is a mental process guided by
entirely objective conditions, the apprehension of the same fact as
a duty is guided more specially by subjective, emotional conditions,
which, whatever our theory as to the nature of the moral feelings,
maybe included under the two general terms, "moral approba-
tion" and "moral disapprobation."
Dr. Cams may, perhaps, say that this is a misconstruction of
his views; that, while he recognises the sense of duty, that sense
of duty is governed by the actual facts of reality, and that it is to
these facts that we must ultimately refer as being super-ordinate to
all subjective states. He may say that once development has been
ascertained by scientific research to be an unavoidable law, we
will, as a matter of fact and of necessity, modify our sense of duty
so as to make it correspond with what we necessarily must do.
But to this the obvious answer is, that development is not a law
of human nature individually considered : that some individuals
neither wish to, nor do, "develop," and that their condition is as
much a matter of law and of must as the condition of those who
wish to, and do, "develop." The developmentalist must show
why his line of action is "better" than theirs; he must show that
his line of action is preferable or more desirable ; and, in doing
this, he cannot help appealing to those subjective states in which
preference and desire consist. And if, with Dr. Cams, we reject
the hedonistic theory, in which these states are reducible to pleas-
ure and pain, we must accept the ought and the "moral feelings "
of the intuitionist, although putting on them a scientific interpreta-
tion ; accept them, be it understood, as standards, guides, or crite-
ria; for nature presents to us two opposite roads, either of which
we can, or believe we can, follow; and nothing can determine us
to follow one or the other except either our desire for happiness or
ISse,
€.£:., Fundamental Problems, pp. 191, 202, where "the ought in our breasts," which is
identified with Kant's categorical imperative, is declared to be "an undeniable fact" insepara-
ble from " our moral consciousness " ; and where it is affirmed that, without the moral ought,
" human society could not even exist, nor could it ever have risen into existence."
2 The Monist I, 4, to which I have already referred.
ilbid., p. 560. Compare Ethical Pj-obletn, p. 7, and Religion 0/ Science, p. 28.
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our sense of duty (assuming, with Dr. Carus, that the two are dif-
ferent from each other).
Furthermore, when we come to examine this psychological
characteristic of moral judgments, we find it in irreconcilable con-
flict with the fundamental principles of monistic philosophy. We
cannot rest satisfied with the assertion that the moral feelings are
the concomitant emotional states of our general development, or
that they are ''social instincts" which have grown together with,
and as necessary elements of, social progress, being but the con-
sciousness, on the part of every individual, of his relations to, and
dependence upon, the other individuals constituting the society of
which he is but a subordinate part.^ It becomes indispensable to
see if those feelings be of such a nature as will agree with our sci-
entific doctrines, and whether the sub-criterion of development
consist with the supreme criterion—the cosmical laws. It must be
remembered that, according to our view of these laws, a scoundrel
is as necessarily a scoundrel as a horse is a horse ; and such being
the case, I may appeal to consciousness, and ask : When we are
convinced that the scoundrel is as much a necessary outcome of
cosmical laws as the tiger or the hyena, shall we, or can we, attach
to our judgment of his conduct any feeling of moral disapproba-
tion? If I may, in this matter, judge of the consciousness of others
by my own consciousness, I think the general answer to such ques-
tion is not uncertain. And the reason, in my opinion, is, that the
moral feelings are not only the psychical correlates of our physical
and social evolution : they have been derived, among other sources
and experiences, from the conception of man as a free agent, and
from the exclusion of man from the universal realm of nature ; that
is, they owe their origin to, and are based on, conceptions entirely
antagonistic to the conceptions of monism. To say it is a man's
duty to do a certain action, or that he ought to do a certain action,
is to say that we can reasonably expect him to do that action ; is
to suppose that he can, irrespective of his special constitution,
do the action ; it is, in short, to suppose that it is possible for every
man to act in a certain manner ; and this is obviously a lack of
recognition of that law of causation that asserts that a given man
can act in only one way, whatever that way may be; although, in
our uncertainty as to his real nature, it is not unreasonable to think
that he 7nay act as desired.
[TO BE CONCLUDED.]
1 Such is the view taken by Dr. Carus. (See Ethical Problem, pp. 39, 56.)
